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1 Introduction
Real-world economies often include oligopolistic competition in the same market segment,
in which rms supply multiple vertically di¤erentiated products. In the mobile phone
market, for example, Apple supplies the iPhone 12 to the rst line segment, and Samsung
competes with Apple by supplying the Galaxy S21 to businesses. In the second line
segment, Apple sends the iPhone 10, and Samsung responds by forwarding the Galaxy
S10.
In the existing literature on vertical product di¤erentiation, the quality of the goods
that the rms produce is treated as an endogenous variable. For example, in Bonanno
(1986) and Motta (1993), rms initially choose the quality level and then compete in
a Cournot or Bertrand fashion in an oligopolistic market. Shaked and Sutton (1987)
consider a two-stage game model in which each of horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated
multiproduct rms pays a xed sunk cost for R&D or advertising expenditure to improve
the (perceived) quality of its products in the rst stage and chooses its respective prices
in the second stage. Mussa and Rosen (1978) analyze monopoly price discrimination in
a monopoly model in which the quality level and the quantity consumed by individuals
are distorted downward from the socially e¢ cient level. Gal-Or (1983) extends their
monopoly model to a symmetric Cournot oligopoly model and explores the e¤ect of
quality on the market equilibrium and the impact of increased competition on the quality
levels, price and welfare.
In a horizontally di¤erentiated multiproduct model, Bental and Spiegel (1984) con-
sider an optimal set of product varieties in a monopoly and analyze the relationship
between the degree of di¤erentiation between any two varieties and the variety price, or
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the cost of installing an additional variety. Shaked and Sutton (1990) consider a two-stage
price game model in which each of horizontally di¤erentiated multiproduct rm (potential
entrant) chooses in the rst stage which product(s) it will produce and incurs a sunk
cost per product entered and chooses its respective prices in the second stage. Then
they graphically characterize the market structure in equilibrium using two parameters
that measure expansion and competition e¤ects. Our studys results are also related to
those of marketing studies on product segmentation and product distribution strategies.
Calzada and Valletti (2012) study a model of lm distribution and consumption. They
consider a lm studio that can release two versions of one lm one for theaters and one
for video although they do not consider oligopolistic competition between lm studios.
They show that the optimal strategy for the studio is to introduce versioning (the simul-
taneous release of the lm with one version for theaters and another version for video) if
its goods are not close substitutes for one another. We established a result that indirectly
supports the result of Calzada and Valletti (2012). In their model, versioningand se-
quencingcorrespond to the simultaneous supply and sequential supply, respectively, of
high- and low-quality goods, as in our model. In the case of sequential supply, the lm
studio supplies a high-quality lm version to theaters and then launches a low-quality
DVD version in the same market.
By taking an "upgrade approach," in which a monopolist chooses not the output
quantity of actual products but instead upgrades one to be equivalent to another, Johnson
and Myatt (2003) consider monopoly and duopoly models in which a rm (or rms) sells
(sell) multiple quality-di¤erentiated products and frequently changes is product lines
when a competitor enters the market in the duopoly model. They provided an explanation
for the common strategies of using ghting brands and pruning product lines. In
particular, they endogenized not only the quality level of each good but also the number
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of goods that rm supplied to the market.
In markets where rms supply multiple vertically di¤erentiated products, they some-
times compete with rivals that supply one or more vertically di¤erentiated products (i.e.,
the rival chooses a single product line) to the same market segment. The seminal works
in the literature on the product lines of multiple vertically di¤erentiated products in an
oligopoly setting are Johnson and Myatt (2006) and (2018). Using the same "upgrade ap-
proach," in Johnson and Myatt (2006), they show that the results for the single-product
Cournot equilibrium supply carry over to the supply of updates but not necessary to the
full set of complete products (that is, all vertically di¤erentiated products are supplied
by all rms in equilibrium). In their most recent work (2018), they extend their analysis
to allow for cost asymmetries among rms and di¤erences in product lines congurations
among rivals and derive equilibrium product lines and explore their determinants. The
results derived in Johnson and Myatt (2018) are general, but some results, propositions
3 and 4 and a corollary in section 5 are closely related to the results in our paper. In
section 2, we explore how our results correspond to those of propositions 3 and 4 and
the corollary in Johnson and Myatt (2018). We conrm that in equilibrium E that we
derive in our model, the inequality conditions in proposition 3 in their paper are strictly
satised, so there exists an equilibrium (equilibrium E) in which all rms o¤er complete
product lines (they o¤er both high- and low-quality goods).
The rst contribution of this paper is to identify the existence of equilibria that
correspond to those in proposition 4 in Johnson and Myatt (2018). However, in our
model, one of the conditions whereby the cost advantage of rm 1, the sum of output
with a higher quality level than VL is strictly increasing in quality in proposition 4 in
their paper (2018) is not satised. Our second contribution is that we nd an equilibrium
(equilibrium C in proposition 1) in which the high-cost rm 2 supplies only low-quality
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good, but the low-cost rm 1 supplies both the high- and low-quality goods in the market.
Thus, there is a gap between the rmstwo product lines, although the quality increment
from the low- to the high-quality good is su¢ ciently large (in proposition 4 in Johnson and
Myatt (2018), the condition for the quality increment from the low- to the high-quality
good is su¢ ciently small).
In Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a), we considered a game that includes heterogeneous
unit production costs between rms for high-quality goods but homogeneous costs for
low-quality products. We described the rmsproduct line strategies based on the rel-
ative quality of the products and on the cost-e¢ ciency ratios of the rms producing
the high-quality good. Unlike most previous studies, in our model (in Kitamura and
Shinkai(2015a) and in this study), both the quality level and the number of di¤erenti-
ated goods that each rm supplies are exogenously given, and we also do not explicitly
consider the stage of product line choice with a xed sunk costas Shaked and Sutton
(1987, 1990) did. We rst derived equilibria by assuming that, in any equilibrium, each
rival rm chooses positive outputs for both the high- and the low-quality good. Conse-
quently, these equilibria included cases in which a rm chooses negative output for one
of the goods for some parameter ranges (rmsrelative quality ratio or cost-ine¢ ciency
ratio for the high-quality good). We then retroactively excluded the ranges of parame-
ters in equilibrium that result in any negative outputs, and we graphically described the
rmsproduct line strategies based on the relative quality of the products and on the
cost-e¢ ciency ratios between the rms in the case of high-quality goods.
Although Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a) assumed that each rival rm chooses positive
outputs for both goods in duopolistic competition, it is crucial that each rm considers
its rivalsproduct line strategies when choosing its own strategy. In these cases, it is
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important that each rm chooses its own product line strategies for multiple products,
given their expectations of their rivalsproduct line reactions. Therefore, in this study,
we consider the product line strategies of duopolistic rms that each supply two verti-
cally di¤erentiated products under nonnegative output constraints and an expectation
regarding their rivalsproduct line reactions. This study di¤ers from our earlier study,
Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a) in the following respects.
First, in this study, we explicitly examine the product line strategies of duopolistic
rms that supply two vertically di¤erentiated products under a nonnegative output con-
straint and an expectation with respect to rivalsproduct line reactions. We show that
there are ve nontrivial equilibria with positive outputs for one or both products and
that both rms have positive prots in each equilibrium. In these equilibria, the ranges
of the two ratio parameters for which positive equilibrium outputs exist for the two rms
di¤er. We graphically describe the rmsproduct line strategies in equilibrium, based
on the relative quality of the products and on the rmsrelative cost e¢ ciency for the
high-quality good (Figure 1).
Second, in each of the nontrivial equilibria, we illustrate how the changes in the relative
superiority of high-quality good, , and relative cost ine¢ ciency of the high-quality good
of rm 2, c2H , a¤ect the product lines of rms in each equilibrium through production
substitution between goods within a rm and that of goods between rms1.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our
model and derive the duopoly equilibrium product lines with two vertically di¤erentiated
products in the same market under a nonnegative output constraint and an expectation
1Professor John Sutton suggested this analysis to us in his comment on our presentation of an ear-
lier version of this study, Shinkai and Kitamura (2015b), at EARIE 2015, the Annual Conference of
the European Association for Research Industrial Economics, in Munich, Germany. His comment and
suggestion have much improved our study.
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with respect to rivalsproduct line reactions. Furthermore, we graphically describe the
rmsproduct line strategies in equilibrium, based on the relative quality of the di¤er-
entiated products and on the rms relative cost e¢ ciency for the high-quality good and
explore how the changes in the relative superiority of high-quality good, , and relative
cost ine¢ ciency for the high-quality good of the ine¤ective rm (which has a higher unit
cost than its rival) a¤ect product lines of rms in each equilibrium (Figure 1). In addition,
we describes the relationship of the results of this proposition with those of propositions
3 and 4 and the corollary in Johnson and Myatt (2018) and present the equilibrium price
and prots of the rms for each of ve equilibria. In Section 3, we illustrate how the
changes in the relative superiority of high-quality good, , and the relative cost ine¢ -
ciency for the high-quality good of rm 2, c2H , a¤ect the product lines and prots of
rms in each equilibrium through product substitution between goods within a rm and
that of goods between rms. Finally, Section 4 concludes this paper.
2 The Model and the Equilibria of the Game
Suppose that there are two rms (i = 1; 2) in a duopoly, each of which produces two
goods (H and L), which di¤er in terms of quality. We assume a continuum of consumers,
represented by a taste parameter, , which is uniformly distributed between 0 and r (> 0)
with density 1. We further assume that a consumer is of type  2 [0; r]; for r > 0. The
consumerspreferences are the standard Mussa and Rosen preferences. Thus, the utility
(net benet) of consumer  who buys good  (= H;L) from rm i (= 1; 2) is given by
Ui() = V   pi i =; 1; 2  = H;L: (1)
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To maximize his/her surplus, each consumer decides whether to buy nothing or one unit
of good  from rm i.
Let VH and VL denote the quality of the high-quality and the low-quality good, re-
spectively. Then, the maximum amount that consumers are willing to pay for each good
is assumed to be VH = VL =  > VL = 1. Thus, for simplicity, we normalize the quality
of the low-quality good by setting VL = 1 and assume that the quality of the high-quality
good is  times that of the low-quality good.
Note that the consumerspreferences and the utility of each consumer never change
when the quality of both products changes exogenously.
Good  (= H;L) is assumed to be homogeneous for all consumers. Suppose that
there always exists a consumer iL; i = 1; 2 who is indi¤erent between purchasing good





= piL; i = 1; 2. (2)
We can derive the demand for good H as QH = r   b and that for good L as
QL = b   iL, as shown in Figure 1, where Q = qi + qj for  = H;L and j = 1; 2:
Without loss of generality, we set r = 1. Here, b, the threshold between the demand for
H and that for L, is given by
b = (pH   pL)=(  1): (3)
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Then, as in Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a), we derive the following inverse demand
functions:
8>><>>:
pH = VH(1 QH) QL = (1 QH) QL
pL = VL  QH  QL = 1 QH  QL,
(4)
where Q = qi + qj and p and qi denote the price of good  and rm is output
of good , respectively, for  = H;L and i; j = 1; 2.
Moreover, suppose that each rm has constant returns to scale and that ciH > ciL =
cjL = cL = 0, where ci is rm is marginal and average cost of good . This implies
that a high-quality good incurs a higher cost of production than a low-quality good.
Here, without loss of generality, we assume that c2H > c1H = 1 > ciL = 0, which means
that rm 1 is more e¢ cient than rm 2 at producing the high-quality good, but as for
low-quality good, there is erce cost competition between the two rms. Under these
assumptions, each rms prot is dened in the following manner:
i = (pH   ciH)qiH + pLqiL i = 1; 2: (5)
Firm i(= 1; 2) chooses the outputs for H and L to maximize its prot function in
Cournot fashion under nonnegative output constraints, provided that rm j(6= i) chooses
any given product line strategy sj2 Sj  f(0; 0); (+; 0); (0;+); (+;+)g, where (0; 0) im-





i = f(1  qiH   qjH)  qiL   qjL   ciH)gqiH + (1  qiH   qjH   qiL   qjL)qiL (6)
s:t: qiH  0; qiL  0; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2.













qiH  0; qiL  0, i = 1; 2. (9)
Each rm chooses its product line strategy for the two vertically di¤erentiated prod-
ucts, that is, whether to produce positive (zero) quantities of products H and L given
the rival rms product line strategy.
Note that each inequality @i=@qi  0 in (7) and the corresponding complementary
slackness condition qi  @i=@qi = 0 in (8) imply that if the marginal revenue of rm
i for product (= H;L) is below (the same as) its marginal cost, then rm i does not
produce (does produce) a positive quantity of the product.
In the following, we present the equilibria of a Cournot duopoly game in which each
rm can choose its product line and outputs for the two vertically di¤erentiated goods.
The rms operate under a nonnegative output constraint. After presenting the equi-
librium, we describe the rmsproduct line strategies based on the products relative
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quality and on the rms relative cost e¢ ciency with respect to the high-quality good in
equilibrium.
There are 15 cases to be solved, based on each rms product line strategies, given
the rms expectation of its rivals product line strategies, which excludes the trivial case
in which neither rm produces H or L.
 Case A: s1 = (0;+); s2 = (0;+)
In this case, a duopoly market for the low-quality good is realized in equilibrium.
 Case B: s1 = (+; 0); s2 = (0;+)
In this case, each rm specializes in the product that is more cost e¢ cient for it.
 Case C: s1 = (+; 0); s2 = (+;+)
In case C, rm 2 (which has a higher unit cost for the high-quality product H)
produces both products, but rm 1, which is e¢ cient in the production of product
H, specializes in product H.
 Case D: s1 = (+;+); s2 = (0;+)
In this case, in contrast to case C, rm 1 is e¢ cient in producing product H and
supplies both products. However, the ine¢ cient rm 2 specializes in product L.
 Case E: s1 = (+;+); s2 = (+;+)
In case E, both rms produce both products.
Now, we present the following proposition on the equilibria of our game. For the
sketch of the derivation and proofs, see the appendix.
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Proposition 1 In the duopoly equilibrium of the game, given the rivals expectation of
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where 1 < c2H < 2 and   2c2H . (16)
The last inequalities followed since these equilibrium outputs must hold due to both the
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positive output condition and the necessary condition. A, B, C, D, and E indicate the
area in the c2H- plane in Figure 1. As the parameters ; c2H change, except for case A,
the equilibrium product lines of rms change through their substitution of the production
of goods as illustrated by the directions of the solid and broken arrows in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Note that each equilibrium output presented in proposition 1 is that of a duopoly
game, given the rmsexpectations about their rivals nonnegative output(s). Note that
we assume that c2H > c1H = 1 and VH = VL =  > VL = 1. The horizontal and vertical
axes in Figure 1 show the relative cost ratio c2H and the quality ratio , respectively.
Here, we present the equilibrium prices and equilibrium prots of both rms in 5 nontrivial
equilibria presented in proposition 1.























In Figure 1, area B corresponds to this case. In area B, the relative cost ine¢ ciency
of the high-quality good for rm 2, c2H , is relatively strong compared to , the relative
quality superiority of the high-quality product H: From (4), (5), and (11), we obtain the























For qC1H > 0, the inequality  > 2  c2H holds because c2H  2. In Figure 1, areas C.1
and C.2 correspond to this case. From (4), (5), and (13), the corresponding equilibrium





+ c2H + 1
3
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43   4(4c2H   1)2 + 4(2c2H   1)(2c2H + 1)  (7c2H   2) (c2H   2)
36(  1) . (22)
The relative superiority, , of the high-quality good is small compared to the relative
cost ine¢ ciency, c2H , of the high-quality good for rm 2 in case D.
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2   (4c2H   1)+ 4c22H   1

. (26)
Regarding the equilibrium prots of the rms for these ve nontrivial equilibria, we






2 , k = B;C;D and E.
In words, the rm that is cost e¢ cient in producing the high-quality product earns
more than the ine¢ cient rm does in all equilibria except for equilibrium A.
2.1 Di¤erence of the Results of Proposition 1 from those in
Johnson and Myatt (2018)
In this section, we describe the relationship of the results of this proposition with those
of propositions 3 and 4 and the corollary in Johnson and Myatt (2018).
In the following, we explore how our results correspond to those of propositions 3 and
4 and the corollary in Johnson and Myatt (2018).
In subsection Linear Demand Specication 2, in section 5 of their paper, the fol-





0(q) > 0; c00(q)  0; cr(q):
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production cost of rm r for the good with the ith upgrade quality qi(q1 < q2 <    < qI),
r = 1; :::; R. c(qi): the industrial average production cost of the good with the ith upgrade
quality qi. 1R
PR




Applying the notations in this paper to the above, R = 2; qL = 1 < qH = ; cr(L) =
rc(L) = 0 = crL = 0; r = 1; 2:c1(H) = 1c(H) = c1H = 1;
c2(H) = 2c(H) = c2H > 1; qH = ; qL = 1;qH = qH   qL =   1
c(L) = 1
2
(c1L + c2L) =
1
2
(0 + 0) = 0; c(H) = 1
2
(c1H + c2H) =
1
2
(1 + c2H); c2(H) =














Thus, we see that 1
2
(1+ 2) = 1 holds. From notations in our model and in Johnson
and Myatt (2018), we have cH1 = c1H   c1L = 1  0 = 1;cH2 = c2H   c2L = c2H   0 =
c2H . In our model, because there exist only two qualities VH = (> 1),VL = 1, there is
thus no variety with quality below qL = VL, and from our assumption that c1L = c2L = 0,
denoting a ctional quality level below qL = VL, by qo( 0), without loss of generality,
we can assume that c1(qo) = c2(qo)  0. Hence, we have c1(qL) = c1(VL)   c1(qo) =

















(0 + 0) = 0:
Furthermore, from notations in our model and in Johnson and Myatt (2018), we have,
qH1 = qH1   qL1 =   1;qH2 = qH2   qL2 =   1;qL1  qL1   qo = VL   0 = 1 and










(qL1 +qL2) = 1.



























from our assumption that c2H > 1
and  > c2H in equilibrium E in this paper. Hence, we can conrm that our model set-
ting strictly satises the inequalities in (17), so there exists an equilibrium (equilibrium
E) in which all rms o¤er complete product lines (they o¤er both positive quantities of
goods H and L). Thus, proposition 3 in Johnson and Myatt (2018) holds in our model.
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Next, we explore whether proposition 4 in Johnson and Myatt (2018) holds in our
model. From equation (14) in Johnson and Myatt (2018), we obtain
ZyL2 =
1 + [2  32(cL=qL)
1 + 2
=






1 + [2  32(cH=qH)]
1 + 2
=




(1 + c2H)=(  1)]
3
=
  (1 + c2H)
  1 < 1 = Z
y
L1:
Therefore, for the disadvantaged rm 2, fZyi2g is strictly decreasing in i(= L;Hg.
However, we see that
ZyL1 =
1 + [2  31(cL=qL)
1 + 2
=







1 + [2  31(cH=qH)]
1 + 2
=








  1 < 1 = Z
y
L1.
For the advantaged rm 1, fZyi1g is not strictly increasing but strictly decreasing in
i(= L;Hg in our model. Thus, our model setting does not satisfy one of the conditions
that for the advantaged rm 1, fZyi1g is strictly increasing in i(= L;Hg in proposition 4 in
Johnson and Myatt (2018). Nevertheless, from the result of proposition 1 in this paper,
we nd that the low-cost rm 1 sells only (the higher-quality) good H in equilibrium
case C, the high-cost rm 2 sells only (the lower-quality) good L in equilibrium case D,
and the two rms split the market in equilibrium case B. These results exactly imply
statements (a), (b) and (c), respectively, in proposition 4 in Johnson and Myatt (2018).
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Furthermore, in proposition 1, we show that in equilibrium case C, the high-cost rm 2
supplies only good L, but the low-cost rm 1 supplies both goods H and L in the market
so there is a gap between the rmstwo product lines, although the quality increment,
  1 between goods H and L is su¢ ciently large! This result is di¤erent from statement
(d) in proposition 4 in Johnson and Myatt (2018).
The reason that fZyi1g is not strictly increasing but strictly decreasing in i(= L;Hg
in our model is our assumption that ciL = 0; i = 1; 2, and in our model, there are only
two xed qualities, so there exists only one upgrade! Therefore, we set cLi  ciL 0 =
ciL = 0; i = 1; 2 so that cL = 12(cL1 +cL2) = 0.
3 E¤ects of Changes in the Relative Superiority of
the High-quality Good and its Cost Ine¢ ciency for
Firms on Product Lines
In this section, we illustrate how the changes in relative superiority for high-quality good,
, and relative cost ine¢ ciency for the high-quality good of rm 2, c2H , a¤ect product
lines and prots of rms in each equilibrium through production substitution between
goods within a rm and that of goods between rms.
In case A, taking into account the results of proposition 1, we nd that the relative
superiority  of the high-quality good is too small compared to the unit costs of good H.
Therefore, both rms specialize in good L, and the market for good L becomes a Cournot
duopoly. Hence, the two rmsequilibrium prots are identical, and any change in  and
c2H in area A has no e¤ect on the outputs and prots of the rms.
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At any point (c2H ; ) in equilibrium E in area E in Figure 1, the relative cost ratio
c2H is between one and two, so the di¤erence between the unit costs of the two rms
is small. In the lower part of area E, the relative superiority of the high-quality good
 is not very large. Thus, both rms are likely to supply high- and low-quality goods.
Naturally, the e¢ cient rm 1 produces more of the high-quality good H than of the
low-quality good L because its production costs for H are lower than those of the rival
rm; its protability is high owing to the superiority in producing the high-quality good
. As  becomes su¢ ciently large, we nd substitution of production away from the
low-quality good and toward the high-quality good by both rms as the point (c2H ; )
moves from the lower part to the upper part of area E in Figure 1, and this substitution
e¤ect is stronger for the e¢ cient rm than for the ine¢ cient rm. Hence, the prot of the
e¢ cient rm 1 increases as degree of superiority in producing the high-quality product
 and the relative cost ratio c2H increase. In this equilibrium, each of the total outputs
of the two rms, QE1 and Q
E
2 , remains unchanged when  (c2H) increases because the
production substitution quantities from one good to another o¤set each other. Note that
in equilibrium E, QE1 = Q
E
2 = 1=3 from (16). This implies that both goods H and L are
perfect substitutes in each rm, so changing  or c2H causes direct production substitution
between goods H and L within each rm, and subsequently generates indirect production
substitution of each good between the cost-e¢ cient rm 1 and the cost-ine¢ cient rm
2. The former direct e¤ect, however, is weaker than the latter e¤ect. Consequently,
the equilibrium prots of both rms increase as  increases because the increase in 
enhances the production substitution from good L to good H in both rms. However,
the equilibrium prot of rm 1 (rm 2) increases (decreases) as c2H increases since the
increase in c2H enhances the production substitution from good L to good H in rm 1
but does so from good H to good L in rm 2 and the e¢ cient rm 1s markup on good
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H is larger than that of the ine¢ cient rm 2.
At any point (c2H ; ) in area C, the relative superiority  is large compared to the
relative cost ratio c2H . Because the margin of the e¢ cient rm 1 for the high-quality
good H, pCH  1, is very high, rm 1 entirely substitutes the production of good L by that
of good H and specializes in good H, with its relatively large margin compared to that for
the low-quality good L (that is pCL ) . As c2H increases, the ine¢ cient rm 2 substitutes its
production of the high-quality good for that of the low-quality good. The total (i.e. ,the
high-quality goods) output at the e¢ cient rm 1 QC1 (= q
C
1H) decreases (increases) but
the high-quality goods output at ine¢ cient rm 2 qC2H increases (decreases) as  (c2H)
becomes large because the decrease (increase) in QC1 (= q
C
1H) outweighs the increase
(decrease) in the resultant total output of rm 2 QC2 due to the production substitution
from good L (H) to good H (L) within rm 2. From (13) and (22), we can obtain the
following proposition derived from the characteristics that both (i) the marginal costs of
the high-quality good produced by both rms di¤er between rms (c1H 6= c2H) and (ii)
each rm chooses a di¤erent production line (s1 = (+; 0); s2 = (+;+)). For the proof,
see the appendix.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium C, the di¤erence in the prot between rms C1  C2
increases as  or c2H increases, but an increase in the  reduces the di¤erence in the
rmsmarket shares QC1  QC2 .




























q1H   q2H :
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Regarding the slope of these reaction functions, an increase in  leads to a smaller e¤ect
of q2L on both (q1H ; q2H) and directly leads to expansion q2H because of the decrease
in the cost-quality ratio c2H=. As a result, an increase in  causes a large increase in
q2H and a large decrease in q1H , so that QC12 = Q
C
1   QC2 decreases. On the other
hand, because the markup for the high-quality good H of e¢ cient rm 1 is the larger
than those of the high- and low-quality goods of rm 2, rm 1 earns more than rm 2
does irrespective of changes in  and c2H . Then, an increase in  or c2H brings about
a larger markup for the e¢ cient rm 1, which expands the di¤erence in prots between
rms.
In equilibrium B, , the relative superiority of the high-quality good, is larger and
the relative cost ine¢ ciency c2H is not as high as in equilibrium D. Hence, rm 1 stops
producing the low-quality good L and specializes in producing the high-quality good H.
In contrast, the ine¢ cient rm 2 continues to specialize in producing good L because its
relative cost ine¢ ciency of good H over rm 1s is high in this area. However, when  is
su¢ ciently high, rm 1 stops supplying good L and increases its output of good H, so rm
2 increases its output of good L due to the strategic substitution on good L . The prots
of both rms increase as  increases, but the prot of the e¢ cient rm 1 specializing in
good H is larger than that of the ine¢ cient rm 2 specializing good L since the markup
of the high-quality good H is larger than that of the low-quality good. In area B, the
relative superiority  is at a moderate level but is smaller than those in area C, and the
relative cost ratio c2H is larger than those in area C. Hence, rm 2, with its ine¢ cient
production technology for the high-quality good, stops producing good H and specializes
in the low-quality good L. Two monopoly markets appear in this case.
In equilibrium D, the relative superiority of the high-quality good  is relatively small
but the relative cost ratio of the high-quality good c2H is not as small. The ine¢ cient rm
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2 stops producing the high-quality good and specializes in supplying the low-quality good
L, but the e¢ cient rm 1 supplies the high-quality good H to the market, as well as the
low-quality good L. Hence, increasing the relative superiority of the high-quality good 
in area D yields production substitution from the low-quality good L to the high-quality-
good H in rm 1s product line, but there is no change in rm 2s product line. However,
the total output QD1 of rm 1 for both goods L and H does not change because they
o¤set each other by perfect production substitution from good L to good H within the
e¢ cient rm 1 as  increases. Consequently, if the relative superiority of the high-quality
good  increases, then only D increases. Of course, the change in c2H has no e¤ect
because the ine¢ cient rm 2 never produces the high-quality good H in equilibrium D.
As a matter of course, the e¢ cient rm 1 specializing in good H earns more than rm 2
specializing in the low-quality good L.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we consider a duopoly game with two vertically di¤erentiated products un-
der nonnegative output constraints and an expectation with respect to the rivals product
line strategies. We derive an equilibrium for the game and describe the rmsproduct
line strategies and their realized prots in each equilibrium, based on the goodsquality
superiority and relative cost e¢ ciency. In these equilibria, the ranges of the two ra-
tio parameters for which positive equilibrium outputs exist for the two rms di¤er. We
graphically describe the rmsproduct line strategies in equilibrium, based on the relative
quality of the products and on a rms relative cost e¢ ciency for the high-quality good
(Figure 1). Thus, in proposition 1, we nd that there exist equilibria that correspond to
those in proposition 4 in Johnson and Myatt (2018), although in our model, one of the
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conditions regarding the cost advantage rm 1,the sum of output with a higher quality
level than VL is strictly increasing in quality in proposition 4 in their paper (2018) is not
satised. Furthermore, we nd an equilibrium (equilibrium C in proposition 1) in which
the high-cost rm 2 supplies only good L, but the low-cost rm 1 supplies both goods H
and L in the market, and so there is gap between the two rmsproduct lines, despite
that the quality increment from good L to good H is su¢ ciently large (in proposition 4
in Johnson and Myatt (2018), the condition is that the quality increment from good L
to H is su¢ ciently small).
We also show that the cost-e¢ cient rm producing the high-quality good earns more
than the ine¢ cient rm does, except in the special case in which the relative superiority
of the high-quality good  is too small compared to the unit cost of the high-quality good
H. In this case, both rms specialize in good L, and the market for good L becomes a
Cournot duopoly. Thus, both rmsprots are the same. In Section 3, we illustrate how
the changes in the relative superiority of the high-quality good, , and the relative cost
ine¢ ciency for high-quality good of rm 2, c2H , a¤ect the product lines and prots of
rms at each equilibrium through production substitution between goods within a rm
and that of goods between rms.
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Figure 1 Five Equilibria in 𝑐 𝜇 plane 
The light blue line stands for 𝜇 2𝑐 , the light red curve stands for 𝜇 2𝑐 4𝑐 2𝑐 4 .  ,   and  imply 𝜕𝑞∗ 𝜕𝜇⁄ 0, 𝜕𝑞∗ 𝜕𝜇⁄ 0 , 
respectively.  implies 𝜕𝑞∗ 𝜕𝜇⁄ 0 .  and         imply 𝜕𝑞∗ 𝜕𝜇⁄ 0, 𝜕𝑞∗ 𝜕𝑐⁄ 0 ,  respectively.   and        imply 𝜕𝑞∗ 𝜕𝜇⁄
0, 𝜕𝑞∗ 𝜕𝑐⁄ 0 , respectively.  
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